1 CSCG 2025 - KDF_dream

Category: Crypto

Difficulty: Medium

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Flag: dach2025{But_n1st_said_it_was_fine?!???_15f7a069}

Description:

We've managed to insert ourselves into a secure channel between two covert agents, however we overplayed our hand and they have become suspicious that their channel is compromised.

Realising that there is no way to restablish trust over the compromised network, Alice called for them to carry out a NIST Certified KDF protocol to generate a symmetric OTP, and then for them to use this to encrypt a physical message at a dead drop location.

We want to control the message she leaves, can you influence their conversation to control what Bob reads at the dead drop?

2 Introduction

We are given some *Python* files simulating a series of communication exchanges between *Alice* and *Bob*. Luckily enough, we are already an established *Man-in-the-Middle*, so we can intercept, modify and drop any communication between these two parties. The goal of the challenge is to modify the exchanged messages so that *Bob* will receive the message with content like allgoodprintflag from *Alice*. The twist of this challenge lies in the used crypto algorithms like the used key derivation function (KDF) *SP800 108 Counter Mode* and its underlying primitives.


3 Reconnaissance

The communication starts with the popular *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* using a secure group. After both parties calculated the shared key *Alice* and *Bob* agree on one of the three *NIST* certified pseudo random functions (PRF) HMAC, CMAC and KMAC, for the KDF. Both parties randomly select a nonce and exchange these to have a common KDF context. After that, the shared key, the chosen PRF, the common context and some hardcoded string are used to derive a common key out of the KDF algorithm *SP800 108 Counter Mode*. *Alice* then sends *Bob* a message wearecompromised because she is already suspicious about the connection, as the


description tells us. The only way to receive the flag is by somehow making sure *Bob* receives allgoodprintflag as a message.

4 We are the man in the middle

At first, we want to make sure we get to know the shared secret being calculated via the *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange*. Both parties calculate the same shared secret $K = g^{ab} \mod P$ through modular exponentiation with a prime P, which can then be used for symmetric encryption:



But this key exchange is highly vulnerable to a *Man-in-the-Middle* attack. We intercept the communication, inject our public key and thus get for each party another shared secret we can also calculate:



As in most CTF challenges, there is not only one way to solve a problem. The *Man-in-the-Middle* can also force a trivial shared secret $\kappa=1$ by simply sending P-1 to each party. The reason for this is the following equation holding for any prime P:

$$(P-1) \equiv -1 \bmod P$$

This also means Alice and Bob are actually calculating

$$(-1)^k \bmod P$$

with k being their private secret. This results in the shared secret K

$$K = \begin{cases} 1 \bmod P & \text{if } a \text{ and } b \text{ are both even} \\ P - 1 \bmod P & \text{if } a \text{ and } b \text{ are both odd} \\ \bot & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$

The probability of both parties choosing even exponents is:

$$P_{\rm success} = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2 = 25\%$$

5 Deriving some flags

Now that we know the shared secret, we can decrypt every message *Alice* and *Bob* send each other via the KDF-derived OTPs, as we can calculate these ourselves. But this is not enough for the challenge, we need to influence the output and thus the derived OTPs.

There is a NIST document describing the algorithm for *SP 800 108* in detail. It is basically a loop like the following:

```
for i=1 to n, do  K(i) = PRF(K, [i] \mid \mid label \mid \mid 0 \times 00 \mid \mid context \mid \mid [L])  result = result \mid \mid K(i)
```

[x] just means the integer is padded to 4 bytes. The label is the hardcoded string keygen_for_secure_bagdrop and L is the length of the derived key.

Having a look at the used PRFs, one of them seems more suspicious than the others. *HMAC* and *KMAC* internally use hash functions, so they are not that interesting for us, as predicting the output of a hash function is nearly impossible. You would have to brute force the appropriate input for some desired output. But *CMAC* is different, being based on the symmetric crypto algorithm *AES* and the *Cipher Block Chaining Mode* (CBC).

There are some nice explanations out there on how the AES-CMAC works. As we know the shared secret from the *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange*, we also know the key used for *AES*, so we can easily reverse the process of *CMAC*. For the KDF context of each party, we have control over exactly the second half (*for Alice*) and the first half (*for Bob*). So in both cases, we control 16 bytes for the OTP generation.

We will go for the first part of the context of *Bob* influencing his OTP. The reason for this is that at the time of intercepting the nonces and modifying the one dedicated to *Bob*, we already know the nonce for *Alice* and thus can calculate her OTP, which will be important later.

To proceed, we need some formulas. Each M_i got its own block, so overall there are 5 blocks in the CMAC . K_{IN} is the shared secret key from the $\mathit{Diffie-Hellman}$ Key $\mathit{Exchange}$ used as the encryption key for AES . $M_i[x:y]$ represents all of the bytes of M_i starting with index x until index y . K' is the AES subkey we can easily calculate via the shared key and T is the target OTP we want to forge. The green highlighted parts $M_2[14:16]$ and $M_3[0:14]$ are the first half of the context we can control:

$$\begin{split} c_1 &= \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, M_1) \\ c_2 &= \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_1 \oplus M_2) = \mathrm{AES}\Big(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_1 \oplus (M_2[0:14] \| \mathbf{M_2}[\mathbf{14}:\mathbf{16}])\Big) \\ c_3 &= \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_2 \oplus M_3) = \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_2 \oplus (\mathbf{M_3}[0:14] \| M_3[14:16])) \\ c_4 &= \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_3 \oplus M_4) = \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_3 \oplus (M_4[0:14] \| 0x00 \| 0x00)) \\ T &= c_5 = \mathrm{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\, c_4 \oplus M_5 \oplus K') \end{split}$$

Now we can just rearrange and substitute the formula as follows:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{AES}^{-1}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},T) &= c_4 \oplus M_5 \oplus K' \\ &= \operatorname{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,c_3 \oplus (M_4[0:14]\|0 \times 00\|0 \times 00)) \\ &\oplus M_5 \oplus K' \end{split}$$

$$\operatorname{AES}^{-1}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,\operatorname{AES}^{-1}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},T) \\ &\oplus M_5 \oplus K') = c_3 \oplus (M_4[0:14]\|0 \times 00\|0 \times 00) \\ &= \operatorname{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,c_2 \oplus (M_3[0:14]\|M_3[14:16])) \\ &\oplus (M_4[0:14]\|0 \times 00\|0 \times 00) \end{split}$$

$$\operatorname{AES}^{-1}\left(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,\operatorname{AES}^{-1}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},T) \right. \\ &\oplus M_5 \oplus K') \\ &\oplus (M_4[0:14]\|0 \times 00\|0 \times 00)\right) = c_2 \oplus (M_3[0:14]\|M_3[14:16]) \\ &= \operatorname{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,c_1 \oplus (M_2[0:14]\|M_2[14:16])) \\ &\oplus (M_3[0:14]\|M_3[14:16]) \end{split}$$

$$\operatorname{AES}^{-1}\left(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,\operatorname{AES}^{-1}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},T) \right. \\ &\oplus M_5 \oplus K') \\ &\oplus (M_4[0:14]\|0 \times 00\|0 \times 00)\right) \\ \oplus \operatorname{AES}(K_{\mathrm{IN}},\,c_1 \oplus (M_2[0:14]\|M_2[14:16])) = (M_3[0:14]\|M_3[14:16]) \end{split}$$

Now we have on both sides of the equation parts we can control. We just need to brute force $M_2[14:16]$ until the two bytes $M_3[14:16]$, which we are not able to control, are the correct ones. There might be the rare case in which we can't fulfill the equation, although we tried all

$$T = OTP_A \oplus m_{flag} \oplus m_{compromised}$$

With this information and the derived equation, the implementation is straightforward:

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
from Crypto.Util.py3compat import bord
def xor(a, b):
   return bytes(x ^ y for x, y in zip(a, b))
def _shift_bytes(bs, xor_lsb=0):
   num = (bytes_to_long(bs) << 1) ^ xor_lsb</pre>
   return long_to_bytes(num, len(bs))[-len(bs):]
def get_aes_cmac_subkey(key):
   L = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB).encrypt(b"\x00"*16)
   const_Rb = 0x87
   if bord(L[0]) & 0x80:
       _k1 = _shift_bytes(L, const_Rb)
   else:
       _k1 = _shift_bytes(L)
   if bord(_k1[0]) & 0x80:
       _k2 = _shift_bytes(_k1, const_Rb)
       _k2 = _shift_bytes(_k1)
    return _k2
def forge_nonce_for_target(key, T, ctx_second_half):
   c = AES.new(key, AES.MODE\_ECB)
   aes_subkey = get_aes_cmac_subkey(key)
   ctx_first_half_2_16 = None
   testing_int = 0
    ctx_first_half_0_2 = b''
   while testing_int <= 0xFFFF:</pre>
       ctx_first_half_0_2 = testing_int.to_bytes(2, 'big')
       attempt = xor(
           c.decrypt(
               xor(
                   c.decrypt(
                       xor(
                           xor(
                               \rightarrow \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
```

The returned value from the <code>forge_nonce_for_target</code> function is the calculated first half of the context from <code>Bob</code>. After sending <code>Bob</code> the forged nonce, he will receive <code>allgoodprintflag</code> and we get the flag <code>dach2025{But_n1st_said_it_was_fine?!???_15f7a069}</code>. The <code>NIST</code> once proposed <code>CMAC</code> as one of the PRFs you could use together with the KDF <code>SP800 108 Counter Mode</code>. But when some employees from <code>Amazon</code> reported some security issues with this combination, <code>NIST</code> revoked it and added a precise description of the attack in the appendix of their publication.

6 Mitigation

The first problem is the usage of the *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* without any authentication. By using signatures or a public key infrastructure (PKI), the parties could have validated each other's identities, preventing the *Man-in-the-Middle* from sharing their keys or manipulating the key exchange. For the KDF part, obviously you shouldn't use *SP800 108 Counter Mode* with *CMAC* but with for example *HMAC*. Overall, you must be very careful when any crypto modules come into play. Although the *Python* library *cryptography* wasn't used in this challenge but instead *pycryptodome*, they got a great note in their documentation to KDFs:

[...] this module is full of land mines, dragons, and dinosaurs with laser guns.